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
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Henry James.

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PREPAREDNESS A POLITICAL ISSUE

BY THE EDITOR

Wherefore by their fruits ye shall know them.—Matthew VII, 20.

"THIS has been a proud and solemn year for the American Navy," wrote the Secretary of the Navy in his annual report to the President at the close of 1914. "It"—meaning presumably the Navy, not the year—"has shown that it knows how to bear itself under fire, *how to obey orders,* how to maintain the honorable traditions of the service. Allow me, Mr. President, to congratulate you as its Commander in Chief upon the record it has made, upon its *preparedness for duty,* upon the reliance you can place upon it in any time of national need."

The Secretary had previously expatiated eloquently upon the "remarkable demonstration" of efficiency "when the orders *to Mexico* were given." The "gray fighters" were ready, the "giant ships slipped swiftly seaward," tons of coal had already "been gotten aboard the grim steel fighters," one "giant ship" alone had taken aboard "huge quantities" of supplies and was "tugging at her anchor all in a bare twelve hours"—all of which went to show that "The Navy is always ready; it *lives in a state of prepared. ness.*"

When thus exultantly the Secretary celebrated the glori ous triumph of his command over the Mexican navy he had held his high office nearly two years. Presumably he knew —surely he should have known—what he was writing about.

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Let us assume, with mental reservations, that he did, and then let us examine the results of the past fifteen months of his administration. The facts appear in the testimony of the many officers before the House Naval Committee.

Rear Admiral Knight, President of the War College, declared bluntly that "the present fleet is but 50 per cent. efficient because of the shortage of men, battle cruisers and scout ships." "For years," he added, "the navy has been gasping for breath in the matter of men. When a new ship goes into commission it is necessary to strip some other ships and break up organizations."

Admiral Fletcher, commanding the Atlantic fleet, in a letter addressed to the Naval Committee only one month after the Secretary congratulated the Commander in Chief, directed attention to "an alarming shortage of officers and men," aggregating 339 officers and 5,219 men, and last month testified that only fifteen of his twenty-one battleships were on active duty, three of the others lacking officers and men and the remaining three being laid up for repairs. Of the fifteen, however, the Secretary complacently informed the Senate that "when the fleet sailed for Guantanamo on the sixth of this month (January) every vessel, including destroyers, was filled," despite the fact that the complement prescribed by the Bureau of Navigation was short 510 coal-passers, 67 machinists' mates, 48 quartermasters, 32 gunners' mates, 32 boatswains' mates, 62 electricians and 60 yeomen.

When the *Eitel* interned in Hampton Roads, demand was made upon the Navy Department for a battleship to enforce neutrality laws and, when at the expiration of thirty-six hours the old *Alabama* started laboriously from Philadelphia for the Capes, the Secretary declared unctuously that "this is but an indication of the readiness of the reserve battleships for active duty and shows what may be expected." The facts, as set forth by Mr. Henry Reuterdahl, are these:

> After combing the Philadelphia yard, robbing other ships in reserve of their already depleted complements, enough men were scratched together at least to maintain steam and keep the engines going. There were no organized gun crews, no perfected fire control, and no efficient trainers or pointers for the turrets; in fact, the ship had not fired her guns for three years. Only a few rounds of heavy ammunition lay in the magazines, with nothing for the sec-

ondary battery. Arriving at the Roads, fifty rounds of 6-inch projectiles were borrowed from somewhere and the twelve-knot *Alabama* stood ready to keep the twenty-knot liner "put." To make the farce more complete, a submarine, the *D-3,* was added. She could not fire her torpedoes, and, for military purposes, was as useless as a toy boat.

"As far as submarines are concerned," said the Secretary in his report for 1914, "it is believed that ours are on a par with any in the world." And again in 1915: "Especial attention has been given to the submarine question; already much progress has been made." How much progress is indicated by the testimony before the Naval Committee.

Referring to a proposed mobilization of submarines at Hampton Roads, Commander Stirling, Chief of the Atlantic flotilla, said in December, 1914: "When we got down there the Admiral wanted to know what we could do. I told him we then had only one submarine that I thought could efficiently take part in the maneuvers at sea off the coast." Whereupon Commander Stirling was deposed.

A year later Admiral Grant was asked:

"How many submarines have we built?"

"Thirty."

"How many on either coast are fit for service?"

"Five."

Admiral Fletcher corroborated this assertion in these words: "The condition of the submarine flotilla has been very unsatisfactory. Only ten were available for the war problems. At times not more than five submarines were ready for duty. Due to untrained crews, some of the five were not ready to undertake submerged work." Several could not fire their torpedoes and all but one had machinery casualties.

Admiral Grant testified that when he directed attention to the lamentable condition of affairs the Secretary remarked placidly that he "did not believe Congress would give the money" required to speed up construction, and "the subject was dropped."

Admiral Strauss, Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, informed the Committee that his estimates had been cut by the Secretary, without consultation, $11,819,475, including $7,860,475 for ammunition, $1,274,000 for anti-aircraft guns (a clean sweep, in spite of the lessons of the European war) and $2,485,000 for torpedoes and appliances. Admiral

Strauss wanted $3,285,000 to equip the older armored ships with torpedoes of greater range and to fit out new scout cruisers and certain armored cruisers. The Secretary knocked off 75 per cent. of the amount. Subsequently, however, he sought an emergency appropriation, " part of the sum (amount not mentioned) for the furnishing of anti-aircraft guns," but " largely for labor," since it was " highly desirable to avoid a large layoff of workmen "—on the eve of a National election.

An appropriation of $1,000,000 for naval aeroplanes was made more than a year ago, but none as yet has been delivered, although in the meantime nearly five hundred have been built for the Allies. Captain Bristol, head of the aviation corps, testified incidentally that his total estimate had been cut from $13,000,000 to $2,000,000.

According to the General Board: " The Navy is very deficient in gunboats. Though the Navy list gives 30 names under gunboats, only a very limited number of these 30 are in condition to be available for service. Some are old boats of little value, taken over from Spain, of from 400 to 250 tons or less. Of the others no gunboats have been authorized since 1902."

The construction of Battleships 43 and 44 was authorized on March 3rd, 1915, but the plans were not approved by the Secretary until September 9th and not until December 28th was the building allotted to the Brooklyn and Mare Island navy yards, the bids of private concerns having been rejected because they called for $8,068,100 each, or $268,100 more than the Secretary was " authorized to expend." Writing to the Committee on February 9th, 1916, the Secretary admitted that " necessary delay " would be caused by the need of extending the slip at Mare Island, but estimated that the Brooklyn yard could complete its work in thirty-six months, as against the thirty-four months allotted to the private bidders. It happens, however, that there is only one building slip at the Brooklyn yard and that is occupied by the *California,* now in process of construction, so that, as testified by Admiral Stanford, " it will probably be a year before the keel of the new ship can be laid." The chronology of Battleship 43, consequently, if all goes well, will be approximately as follows: Authorized, March 3rd, 1915; plans approved, September 9th, 1915; construction authorized, December 28th, 1915; construction begun, Janu-

ary, 1917; ship completed, January, 1920—five years, less two months, from the date of authorization. The time of completion of Battleship 44 at the unequipped Mare Island yard is wholly conjectural.

After trying in vain to obtain from the Department official records of target practice, Representative Augustus P. Gardner introduced a resolution in Congress requesting the Secretary to furnish the information, submitting simultaneously detailed reports of the work of each ship aggregating only 90 hits out of 826 shots fired—the poorest showing by far ever known. The Secretary declined to confirm or dispute the tabulation upon the ground that other Powers would thus be apprized of " the amount of danger to be expected upon encountering any of these vessels " and that consequently it would be " incompatible with the public interest to make any further statement regarding the scores." That he would have been only too glad to confound his indefatigable critic if the records had furnished a basis for so doing is a fair assumption. In point of fact, Mr. Gardner's figures are known to be substantially accurate, and the present avowed determination of the Secretary's friend who heads the Committee is, not to prove their falsity, but to punish the person who divulged them.

Further evidences of deterioration adduced from the testimonies and statements of commanding officers might be set forth practically without limit, but it suffices to say that all are in accord and of like tenor, succinctly summarized by Admiral Fletcher, Commander in Chief, in his annual report dated August 15th, in these words:

In brief, the principal weaknesses and requirements of the fleet are as follows:

Shortage of officers.

Shortage of men.

Lack of fast armored ships and fast light cruisers.

Limitations of mobility and seagoing qualities of submarines.

Lack of air-craft.

Lack of radio direction finders.

Too frequent overhaul of battleships.

Necessity of maintaining full complements in active ships of the fleet.

Need of additional mining and sweeping vessels.

Desirability of mobilizing ships in reserve annually with active fleet.

Need of battle target practise at long ranges.

Necessity for increased facilities at fleet rendezvous.

Provision for division commanders for mining division and auxiliary division.

Provision for more speed in design of fighting craft intended to operate with the fleet.

Need of anti-air-craft guns.

The Admiral's full report presented the fleet's deficiencies in detail and, conformably to custom, should have been issued to the officers of the fleet. By order of the Secretary, however, it was suppressed, only a meagre summary being allowed circulation. Within a fortnight after the report was submitted the Secretary reviewed the fleet from his flagship off Boston and imperishably recorded the event in his annual report in this grandiloquent phrasing:

Another imposing review of the Atlantic Fleet took place—affording an opportunity for the chief executives of the several States . . . to personally familiarize themselves with the navy as it is —so that they might be in a position to make known to their own people *the high state of efficiency in which the navy is now maintained.*

Passing over the familiar assertions of Admiral Fiske and others to the effect that five years would be required "to bring our navy up to the standard of efficiency of one of the great European navies" and of President Knight of the War College that "war is one thing for which no arrangement is made," the Secretary having lost the carefully prepared plans, we find in Appendix B of the Secretary's report for 1914 under the heading "Active fleet to be in full commission at all times in training for war:"

21 Battleships. 35 Destroyers. 28 Submarines.
+ tenders, tugs, hospital ships, etc., aggregating 126.

Whereas, to-day—and this we have upon the highest expert authority—the *actual efficient fighting force* consists of:

15 Battleships with full complement of officers and men.
18 Destroyers + 5 now on neutrality duty.
17 Aeroplanes all assembled at Florida.
+ tenders, tugs, hospital ships, etc.
No submarines in full condition.
No airships and no aeronautical corps.
No serviceable cruisers.
No General Staff.

So much for Present Preparedness under a Pottering Pacifist Politician.

Of the Secretary's programme, now in Committee of the House, it suffices to say that Admiral Badger left no doubt in the minds of the committee that it was not the work of the General Board. He said the board had drawn up a plan in no way reflecting its ideas as to the needs of the navy, but in response to " an arbitrary order," instructing the board to give its views on a building plan limited to an expenditure of $100,000,000 a year for five years. Even this plan was rejected and an entirely different one was substituted for it by the Secretary, he added. He also declared that the Administration's five year programme will fall far short of keeping the United States in second place among the navies of the world. He characterized the plan as finally recommended by the Secretary as " an eight year completion programme," it being no advance over the custom of authorizing two capital ships a year.

"This last statement," the press report continues, "came as a surprise to many members of the committee and is likely to be the subject of much comment in Congress. It seems to lend support to the contentions of several of the big navy men that the Administration programme consists chiefly of promises and not actual provisions for battleships."

Admiral Badger testified further that the Secretary changed a report of the General Board by eliminating a recommendation for the addition of above 17,000 men to the personnel. The Secretary himself had told the committee previously that he " could not recall that the Board had made any report on the question of personnel."

His programme is not a programme, it is a sham, designed expressely to serve a present political purpose while carrying the burden of expenditure forward to future years.

Here we would gladly leave the distressing record of incompetency and duplicity but for the fact—which cannot be ignored upon the eve of an election which must determine the continuance or the discontinuance of the present Secretary of the Navy in authority—that the appalling impairment of efficiency of our first line of defense is directly traceable to the ignorance, favoritism and vindictiveness of its so-called head. That he ought never to have been appointed is now recognized by all except, unhappily, the President himself who, we assume, continues to consult him " in intimate fashion."

We have already sketched the romantic early career of our First Lord of the Admiralty, but the full story of his arbitrary and shamefully unjust acts, designed to discredit faithful officers, which have resulted in the partial demoralization and the utter disheartenment of the service remains to be told. It suffices the present purpose to instance two examples of suppression and deceit, one of which was hinted at most reluctantly by Admiral Badger. When the Secretary of the Navy reported officially to the President, the Congress and the people, in December, 1914, that the Navy was in a state of full preparedness, he was not speaking out of his abundance of ignorance; he deliberately distorted the truth. Not once but many times, both orally and in writing, his senior adviser, Rear Admiral Fiske, since demoted, had placed before him the facts to the contrary which have since been elicited by the Naval Committee and established by preponderance of testimony. Simultaneously, moreover, he refused to publish the report of the General Board unless its recommendation of a large increase in personnel were eliminated. This having been done with great reluctance, in consequence of the Board's desire to put the other portions of its statement before the public, the Secretary brazenly quoted the emasculated report in support of his assertion that "by wisely utilizing the present enlisted personnel all ships of the classes named can be maintained in full commission without addition to the present enlistment and therefore no legislation is needed." The net result of this subterfuge is a decrease in battleships with full complement from 21 to 15.

In December, 1915, after having suppressed the July report of the General Board, the Secretary repeated the deception of the previous year by publishing another report which omitted important recommendations and represented the views of the Board only partially and therefore both inadequately and inaccurately. He also took to himself special credit for having, for the first time, actually increased the estimates of the General Board when, as a matter of fact, he had limited "by arbitrary order" the amount which the Board should propose,—a total, needless to say, much smaller than it had originally advised. Hence the term "a daniels," now familiar throughout the Navy as synonymous with a shorter and, if conceivable, an uglier word.

It is a matter of common knowledge that a General Staff

is as essential to a modern navy as a brain is to civilized man. Every great foreign Power has such a staff. That the United States has none is due to the persistent opposition of the Secretary, doubtless upon the theory stated by him to Representative Hobson, when that gentleman proposed to make a Chief of Naval Operations a statutory officer, that if such a law were enacted he "might as well go home." For the same reason he abolished the efficient "Aid System," under whose operation the inexcusable loss of lives on submarines could not have taken place.

There for the present we shall leave the Secretary of the Navy, drearily hoping and faithfully promising to ignore other phases, no less savory, of his maladministration unless finally confronted by the dread certainty that—

A vote for Wilson is a vote for Daniels.

In view of the Administration's frank avowal of intent to find "a Western lawyer" to succeed Mr. Garrison, the appointment of Mr. Newton D. Baker as Secretary of War may properly be attributed less to considerations of fitness than of politics. From that standpoint it must be pronounced admirable. Mr. Baker has demonstrated a marked aptitude for public service as administrator of the affairs of a sizable municipality, is deservedly popular and hails from a section of the country hitherto unrecognized by the Administration. As a disciple of the late Tom Johnson and an earnest advocate of Government Ownership, moreover, he will find the company of Mr. McAdoo and Mr. Burleson notably congenial. Although by his own candid admission wholly unconversant with military matters, his conceded ability and excellent record presage painstaking and satisfactory performance of his specific duties.

While intimating that he has given only passing attention to the various plans which have been suggested for increasing the army, the new Secretary quite naturally and properly avoids the possibility of friction, such as arose between his predecessor and the Commander in Chief, by announcing that his views coincide with those of the President, meaning, we infer, the opinions now held, whatever they may be, as contrasted with those originally declared. This is, of course, as it should be and, in any case, of little moment since the passing of the problem from the Department to Congress.

The chief significance of Mr. Baker's appointment is to be found in his attitude towards Preparedness in a broad sense. While refusing to commit himself beyond the general statement that he has " always been a peace advocate " and is now for " peace-at-almost-any-price," he has long been recognized as an ardent pacifist opposed to agitation in favor of stronger defenses. Upon this quite vital point Mr. William B. Brewster, Field Secretary of the National Security League, sheds brilliant illumination in the following uncontradicted statement:

I organized twenty-five States for the National Security League, and visited twenty-two or twenty-three cities for the Mayor's Committee on that question.

I called on Newton D. Baker in the latter part of July, he then being Mayor of Cleveland. He was the first Mayor I had called on in starting the organization work of the League. I asked him to co-operate in organizing the sentiment of preparedness in Cleveland.

He refused absolutely to co-operate, because he said he was a pacifist, and was opposed to the agitation for preparedness. He considered the movement based on hysteria, and that it was a manufactured war scare.

I protested, and indicated to him that it did not proceed from any species of hysteria, but was based on calm practical impulses of thoughtful citizens who had investigated the condition of our defenses and were determined to conduct a campaign of education throughout the country looking to the strengthening of these defenses.

He thought the movement might tend to arouse a militarist spirit. I explained it was not militarism in any sense, but was organized patriotism, and the whole spirit of America was vigorously opposed to the militarist spirit and that we were only endeavoring to organize sentiment for preparedness against war.

He refused positively to have anything to do with the movement, reasserting emphatically his entire opposition to any agitation on the subject of national defense.

Of all the Mayors I interviewed, Mr. Baker was the most pronounced opponent of preparedness.

The difficulty of reconciling this position to that of the President avowed so forcibly and urgently in his recent Western speeches is apparent. We can surmise but two explanations. Either the President does not regard the attitude of the Secretary of War with respect to Preparedness as important or necessarily coincident with his own, or he himself has reverted to his determination declared to Con-

gress in December, 1914, to the effect that, not having been "negligent of defense," "we shall not alter our attitude toward it because some among us are nervous and excited." In any case, the selection of Mr. Baker, of whose views the President must have been apprized in his conference with him while touring the West, for Secretary of War, of all positions, is strangely dissonant with his sharp and "very solemn" warning to the farmers that they could "not afford to postpone this thing"—Preparedness—for the very powerful reasons that "we are daily treading among the most intricate dangers," that "new circumstances have arisen which make it necessary for America to defend herself," that "I do not know what a single day may bring forth" and that it ought not to be possible for "the world to say that the flag of the United States which we love can be stained with impunity."

Simultaneously with the appointment of a Secretary of War opposed to even so much as mere discussion of Preparedness, Chairman Hay presented to the House of Representatives his bill for strengthening national defense through enlargement of the militia of the various States,—a method which has proved wholly ineffectual under the existing Dick Act. "The Committee," he reported, "has no doubt of the constitutional authority of Congress to provide for the discipline, organization, training, and pay of the militia as is set forth in the bill accompanying this report. The framers of the Constitution evidently intended that the militia provided for in that instrument should be a national force and never had any doubt that Congress had full power to make it so."

Without attempting to cite a specific provision of the Constitution conferring upon Congress the power to federalize the militia, Mr. Hay classifies all those, including Mr. Garrison, Mr. Stimson, General Wood and the President himself, who have pronounced valueless "forty-eight little armies commanded by forty-eight different Generals and trained in forty-eight different ways," as "well-meaning but superficial persons." He also ignores completely the clauses restricting the power of Congress to call forth the militia "to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions" and explicitly "reserving to the States respectively the appointment of the officers and the training

of the militia," referred to by the President in his New York speech as constituting an insuperable barrier to putting the National Guard at the disposal of the nation. He "has no doubt," but he suggests no way. When the bill shall have passed, therefore, the President will be confronted by the necessity of either sanctioning a measure which he considers ineffectual or vetoing it, in fulfilment of his written pledge to Mr. Garrison.

The whole question continues to be one of sincerity,—not merely of the President as indicated by his break with Mr. Garrison, his retention of Mr. Daniels, his appointment of Mr. Baker and his yielding to Mr. Hay, but of the Democratic Congress which also must face a verdict at the polls in November. Mr. Oswald Garrison Villard, sometime Second Assistant, speaks in his newspaper of "a theory advanced to me by someone quite close to the President, that he does not really desire the success of his preparedness programme, but hopes for its defeat, in order to spike the guns of the extreme militarists and to prevent the Republicans from charging him with lack of any desire to spring to the rescue of our alleged endangered country," but, despite the disquieting evidences noted, we can hardly suspect that existing political exigencies seem so alarming as to impel Mr. Wilson to follow so tortuous a course. We prefer greatly to believe that, finding himself at the mercy of an obdurate and not over-friendly Congress, he submits to the necessity of working along the only line that promises even a modicum of practical results. As to Congress itself, there seems to be little, if any, doubt of the purpose of the majority of that body to accord just so much—and no whit more—by way of military enlargement as may prove measurably satisfying to Public Opinion,—and this grudgingly and with less heed to actual efficacy than to the votes of militia politicians.

This much we regard as certain: When the Honorable Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy, officially and triumphantly ushered the Honorable Newton D. Baker, Secretary of War, into the office recently vacated by Lindley M. Garrison, one issue of the coming campaign was fixed definitely and irrevocably, to wit:

Real Preparedness vs. *False Economy.*

CONGRESS AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

DIPLOMACY by Town Meeting is not commendable. Neither, in a republic, is diplomacy by a dictator. We shall probably not have, nor be seriously threatened by, either of these extremes. Yet the mention of them serves as a profitable reminder of certain tendencies and potentialities in our governmental system which at times cause some uncertainty and disagreement as to the authoritative conduct of foreign affairs.

The Constitution, after more than a century and a quarter, is still on trial. Or at least it still stands in need of interpretation; which is much the same thing. That is one of the circumstances attendant upon a written constitution. With an unwritten one, as in England, there is no such trouble. An interpretation may be made any day by simple act of Parliament; if indeed any is ever needed. But in the case of a written one, after it is written the question is bound to arise, What does it mean? John Jay and John Marshall began answering that question, more than a century ago; and other Supreme Court Justices have answered it many times since. But there are some phases of that question, of transcendent interest, which have not been and cannot well be brought before the court for adjudication or interpretation.

It is the theory of the Constitution that the powers and duties of government are divided and apportioned among the three grand branches, the Executive, the Legislative and the Judicial; and that is in general quite true. Yet, particularly between the Executive and the Legislative, there are various overlappings and interlockings and even potential conflicts of authority, which strongly suggest the desirability of a more distinct understanding.

It is the theory of the Constitution that the Executive is to conduct the foreign affairs of the nation. The President receives and appoints envoys and makes treaties. Thus he determines and directs the foreign policy of the nation. But he does not do so absolutely and alone. He may receive such envoys as he will from other lands, but he cannot appoint any without Senatorial assent. He may negotiate such treaties as he pleases, but they cannot be ratified without Senatorial assent. To that extent the Senate is a participant in the conduct of foreign relations.

We might add that in one respect the House of Representatives is also a participant. Frequently treaties require appropriations of money for their fulfilment, and these must be voted, if at all, by the House of Representatives. Now, there is no method of coercing that body, and it is therefore evident that it could, if it so wished, defeat a treaty by refusing the pecuniary means necessary for its execution.

Again, Congress alone, the two Houses in concurrent action, can declare war. The President cannot. Yet the President can commit acts of war, or acts which give cause for war; and can thus force the hand of Congress into declaring war or recognizing the existence of war which, through the President's provocations, has been declared against us by another country. When war is declared, moreover, it must be waged by the President as Commander in Chief of the army and navy. Congress must declare war but cannot wage it. The President cannot declare it but must wage it. In some contingency, then, it is conceivable that the President might refuse to wage a war which Congress had declared, or might wage it in far different fashion from that desired by Congress.

All this suggests the strong need of a close understanding and co-operation between the President and Congress in foreign affairs, even to the extent of something almost resembling one feature of the British system. Such an approximation has just occurred. The President practically asked of Congress, and happily received, a vote of confidence. Theoretically our Executive is not dependent upon the confidence and support of a majority in Congress, as is an English Ministry. Yet it is at times obviously of immense advantage to him, in the conduct of foreign negotiations, to be backed up by a strong Congressional majority; so that a request for such a vote is not inappropriate. Of course if such a vote when asked for were to be refused, the situation would be exceedingly awkward and embarrassing. The President and Cabinet would not be required to resign, as in England, but their authority in the eyes of the outside world would be enormously compromised and impaired.

We shall not expect to see any attempt at specific legislation, decision or decree, declaring when a President shall seek the expressed support of Congress in foreign affairs. But we must earnestly hope for a laying aside of factional spirit and partisanship in Congress in all considerations of

foreign affairs, and for the cultivation of close and confidential relations between Congress and the President. We should not expect nor wish the President to relinquish to Congress or to the Senate the making of a treaty, as Polk did in the Oregon case. But it would be well for him to keep so closely in touch with the Senate as to know before negotiating it whether a proposed treaty would meet the approval of that body. It would also be well for Congress to recognize his initiative in all foreign negotiations and policies, and therefore to refrain from passing any bills or resolutions of any kind which might interfere with the progress and success of his dealings with other nations.

Congress cannot, in fact, conduct diplomatic negotiations. It must leave that to the President. But it would be unspeakably foolish for Congress to pass any acts which would affect our foreign relations in such a way as to embarrass the President. It should back the President up as heartily in his transactions with other nations as it would expect him to back up its declaration of war. And it should recognize his initiative in diplomacy just as completely as he recognizes its initiative in the declaring of war. We would not have the President a dictator in foreign relations. We would not have him abdicate his constitutional prerogative in favor of a Congressional Town Meeting. But between those two extremes we would have the President determine and direct our foreign policy, cordially and loyally supported by Congress without regard to party.

THE SPIRIT OF ALIEN FACTION

We shall not regard it as ominous, but refuse to accept it as an omen; we shall not consider it menacing, for we have confidence in America's ability to overcome it without danger serious enough to cause alarm: but it certainly is disappointing and discreditable to have revived in this country at large, and in the Government at Washington, the spirit of alien faction. Extreme partisanship on purely domestic issues is regrettable and injurious. But it is immeasurably worse to have the lines of party demarcation drawn according to foreign issues, and to have American lawmakers and administrators fighting each other for the sake of the interests of alien lands.

This is a return to one of the most unworthy chapters

of our early history. It was a chapter in four parts; a progressive quadruplicity of evil. The first part was not seriously pernicious. It consisted of the alien—chiefly French—incitements to rebellion; which did not by any means have a decisive effect upon our course, and were chiefly significant as rousing in some American minds expectations of alien help which were not realized. The second part was worse. It comprised the operations of Gerard, the first French Minister to this country, in meddling with the affairs of Congress and striving to direct our civil and military policy. It aimed at persuading the United States to forswear independence and to be forever content with a French protectorate.

From this second part there was swift and easy progress to the third and still greater evil. This was the organized and persistent attempt of aliens to subsidize and otherwise corrupt and control Congress and the American Government generally. As early as 1775, indeed, Bonvouloir had boasted concerning Americans, "I can do what I please with them." Luzerne, the second French Minister to America, devoted his attention very largely to corruption. He subsidized newspapers, and bribed members of Congress. Durand has declared that Luzerne paid Thomas Paine a subsidy of $1,000 a year while the latter was secretary of the Congressional Committee on Foreign Affairs. That may be a libel upon Paine. But Luzerne himself openly boasted that he had, in 1781, secured the election of Robert R. Livingston to the foreign secretaryship. We cannot believe that Livingston was privy to Luzerne's work, but it is not unlikely that the French diplomat's boast was true. Of course it is well known that the French Government exerted all its force to secure the appointment of John Jay instead of John Adams as peace commissioner, vainly imagining that Jay, because of his Huguenot descent, would favor France in the negotiations and indeed be a pliant tool in the hands of Vergennes. In that the French intriguers were defeated, but they afterward influenced Congress to appoint four colleagues to act with Adams, of whom two served.

It was with these and similar things still vivid in memory that one evening long after the war, sitting in Jay's house at Bedford, Gouverneur Morris remarked, "Jay, what a lot of damned scoundrels we had in that second Congress!" "Yes," responded Jay, "that we had!"

The fourth and worst part of all was the division of Congress into two factions, "Pro-Gallican" and "Anti-Gallican," or "Gallican" and "Anglican." Such factions existed and were perniciously active in 1779, in the debates over the prospective terms of peace; the "Anti-Gallicans" demanding American rights in the North Atlantic fisheries, and the "Pro-Gallicans" opposing that demand. The fact that the fisheries question remained unsettled for a century and a quarter, to the great disturbance of our relations, was to be ascribed primarily to that prevalence of faction in the days of our peace-making at the end of the Revolution.

All through the Confederation, and through Washington's Administration, alien factions raged in Congress and more than once or twice imperiled the integrity of the nation. That spirit strove to prevent that proclamation of neutrality by Washington which marked an epoch in international relations. It encouraged the mad extravagances of Genet. It so compromised the dignity and the unity of the United States in the eyes of other nations as to induce the steadily growing aggressions of European belligerents upon our commercial and other rights. The commanding personality of Washington restrained it in a measure. But with the accession of Adams the last restraint was removed, and factionalism, of alien inspiration, for alien purposes and advantage, raged unchecked to a degree never known before or since; until our own time.

It was hoped, after the Federalist *débâcle,* that faction of that type would never again be known in this republic. Now it must be sadly confessed that that hope was vain. We do not say that faction has gone as far in the twentieth century as it did in the closing years of the eighteenth. But we do say that it displays precisely the same positively pernicious and potentially mischievous spirit. Now, as then, American national lawmakers are shaping their course with chief regard not to the welfare of America but to the advantage of a foreign nation. Now, as then, the President of the United States is being attacked because he refuses to shape his policy according to the dictates of an alien Power. It is an evil thing. It will not bring disaster, because the American nation as a whole is too sane and strong to permit it to pass the danger line. But no reproof, no condemnation, can be too severe for those who are responsible for it.

The alien lobbyist, who seeks to influence the action of American legislators, is not the worst figure in the scene. Him we can deal with summarily, as we have already dealt with several of his kind. But the American citizen, Senator or Representative in Congress, who listens to him and is captured by his blandishments or his bribes,—he it is who presents the most discreditable spectacle and the most difficult problem. But even he is not beyond the reach of effective rebuke and punishment. We misinterpret the temper of the American people if the coming campaign does not make alien faction odious and establish the principle that all American political parties, whatever their number and their names, shall indeed be American parties. There must be no room for alien propaganda on American soil.

"It is impossible," said Monroe, "that the allied Powers should extend their political system to any part of either [American] continent without endangering our peace and happiness." We have hitherto effectively prevented European Powers from extending their system, in physical form, to Mexico and Venezuela. The present task is to prevent them from extending it, in spirit, to the District of Columbia itself.

SEE STRAIGHT AND THINK STRAIGHT

See straight. Think straight. Then, in consequence as a matter of course, act straight. These are the urgent needs of the time, for the Government; and in this country, as we so often boast and too often fail to realize and to practice, the Government means the whole people. Never, probably, in all our history have these needs been greater than they now are. That is partly because of the transcendent importance of the issues confronting us. It is also partly because of the exceptional and unprecedented efforts which are being persistently made to befog those issues and to mislead the popular and the official mind.

Those efforts, it must be confessed with humiliation, have secured a considerable measure of success. Many people are thinking along zigzags and serpentines instead of straight lines. They are the victims of plausible and ingenious misrepresentations, addressed shrewdly to their prejudices, their predilections or their selfish interests. In consequence they insist upon the most illogical and impos-

sible conclusions; and esteem themselves vastly aggrieved by a simple statement of the truth.

A noteworthy recent example of such error was presented in the monster petition which was laid before Congress by an organization of women. Congress was asked to prohibit the further exportation of munitions of war because —among other reasons—Germany, at the request of our Government, had prohibited the sale of arms to Spain during our war with that country. Now that involved two direct falsehoods. One was that our Government asked Germany to stop the sale of arms; the truth being that no such request was ever made. The other was, that Germany forbade the export of arms; the truth being that she did not forbid it. We might add that a third falsehood was implied, namely, that Germans sold no arms to Spain during that war; the truth being that they did sell arms and munitions to Spain freely all through that war.

When exception was taken to these misrepresentations, the sponsors for the petition protested bitterly against the correction as a gross injustice to them, and they referred to the Autobiography of Mr. Andrew D. White, who was then our Ambassador to Germany, as authority for their statement. But that work contained no such statement as that which they had made. Instead, it referred to a single incident, which, as more fully explained by Mr. White afterward, was as follows: Hearing that a Spanish steamer was about to sail from a German port with a cargo of munitions, Mr. White asked the German authorities to have her departure delayed until she could be searched to his satisfaction to prove that she was in no way violating neutrality by being fitted out as a warship or commerce destroyer. The authorities complied; the vessel was held for a few hours and examined; and then was permitted to proceed with her contraband cargo. That was all. Upon that incident, seen with distorted vision and considered by distorted minds, the whole fiction of a German embargo on arms at our request was built up. And the explicit declaration of Mr. White, that he never asked for an embargo, that there never was one, and that warlike supplies were freely shipped from Germany to Spain all through that war; and the explicit declaration of the present Secretary of State, that no such request for an embargo was ever made of Germany by our

Government—all these count for nothing to the propagandists of the fiction.

The controversy over the carrying of defensive arms on merchantmen is another case in point. Some seek to condemn such equipment as though it were something new, while the fact is that it is an old practice, sanctioned by immemorial usage and recognition. Others, on the other hand, admitting that it is an old practice, demand that it now be abandoned, because Germany has begun using submarine boats upon which the fire of even those small guns would be fatal. That is to say, they demand that the rules of the game be radically altered while the game is in progress. They demand that the rules of war, and international law, be changed in the midst of the war, just because Germany is pursuing a new style of warfare to which the established rules are disadvantageous.

Similarly illogical was the demand for an embargo on arms, when it was made before the fiction of a German embargo in 1898 was invented. The free sale of arms had been an invariable principle of our Government from its earliest years, and had been practised at the beginning of this war. To these thinkers of crooked thoughts it seemed proper that we should arbitrarily reverse our policy, in the midst of the war, because continuance in it would be to the disadvantage of one of the belligerents. By some inscrutable process of reasoning they reached the conclusion that the sale of arms should be stopped because it was helpful to the Allies and harmful to Germany; quite loftily ignoring the converse, that such an embargo would be helpful to Germany and harmful to the Allies. The latter, they thought, would be neutral; the former, unneutral.

A similar lack of straight seeing and straight thinking was perceptible in the controversies over various other matters connected with or arising from the war. People fail to see things as they are, and fail to draw from them deductions which would be logical even if things were as they imagined them to be. The saying is as true as it is homely that

> Your labor is lost and your argument wrecked
> If your major premise is incorrect.

But now not only are major premises incorrect, but the syllogisms which are based upon them are incorrectly formed. It is crooked building, on crooked foundations.

DEEPEN THE CAPE COD CANAL

PRIOR to the War for Independence the Cape Cod Canal had been urged from humanitarian and commercial reasons; in 1776 its value from a military point of view was at once perceived. In the spring of that year, General Washington, knowing that Lord Howe's fleet, discomfited, was about to sail from Boston, sent Machin to the eight-mile isthmus at Cape Cod, hoping that the engineer might find a route for small vessels from Barnstable to Buzzard's Bay, and feeling sure that he could outsail the slow ships of the enemy if a route could be found through inland waters to New York. A report was made to him that only three miles of low intervening sand separated the east and west flowing creeks. Washington never forgot how slight was this barrier, and how essential its removal in order "to give greater security to navigation *and against the enemy.*"

At the present critical period of our country's preparedness, the subject of financial returns from any canal does not appeal. We are faced by the question: How can a coastwise canal system be made to protect the United States, by contributing to the defense of the Atlantic coast and increasing the sea power of the whole country?

This question has been receiving especial attention during the last few years by the various societies which are awakening an interest in improved waterways. This increasing interest, arising from provincial and selfish motives, is gradually concentrating upon broad principles. The question is now one of deeper outlets from the larger rivers, as well as improved coastwise interior channels from Florida to Maine. If these latter were built, a passage for men-of-war and torpedo boats through in-shore routes would be assured. The need of armed convoys for colliers and transports would be materially reduced, while the smaller military craft could proceed, without danger from the sea or from an enemy, along safe routes to their ordered rendezvous.

It has been apparent, however, that the United States, even with its immense financial resources, will not be able, for some time to come, to make the outlay necessary to deepen the whole net-work of sounds along the Atlantic seaboard. Many are being improved; others will be deepened from time to time either through State or local aid.

Fortunately, however, the most important protective canal of our eastern seaboard, that of Cape Cod, has been completed by a private corporation for the use of commerce. The importance of this canal as a *military* asset is becoming more than ever appreciated since the question of ocean defense has been brought so prominently before us by the present European War.

If the need for this canal was felt during the Revolution, it is infinitely more important today as a means of defense against a possible foreign aggression. The major part of the wealth of the Atlantic coast is situated north of Chesapeake Bay, and of that wealth a very large portion lies between New York and Maine. For that reason the first and most important line of defense against attack by sea is, of course, a battleship fleet to engage the enemy before it reaches our shores. But the people of the United States will demand, in addition to the off-shore fleet, a secondary fleet of " capital ships " awaiting the enemy and stationed in the waters of New York Harbor, Narragansett Bay, and Provincetown. This will mean three squadrons, which must be united with the utmost mobility. Their formation into one whole, with dispatch, at some critical moment, may spell victory, and prevent the landing of troops even in case the off-shore fleet should sustain a partial or complete defeat. To insure the union of these squadrons, two things are absolutely necessary: First, it should be noted that the New York Navy Yard has only one safe exit from the greatest maritime port of this country, namely, through the Sandy Hook channel. A few minor shoals to the eastward of the Navy Yard, near Hell Gate, still exist. They should at once be removed. The failure to do this in the past, and the small expense involved, must be considered a military delinquency of the gravest character. When these are removed, the great city of New York will have two deep-water entrances: one through the Lower Bay; the other extending through a protected sound, by which vessels in Narragansett Bay or the Hudson can support one another over a total distance of only 155 miles. If, instead of this second route, the one to the south of Long Island were taken, the distance would be increased to 219 miles, and the fleet would be subject to attack during transit.

On the north shore of Long Island Sound are the numerous large cities in which war material is manufactured,

and the first aim of an enemy's fleet would be to control the eastern end of Long Island and thus dominate the towns of Rhode Island and Connecticut, and the Sound approach to New York.

For a battleship fleet the distance from Narragansett Bay to Nantucket Light is 108 statute miles, and from there to Boston 165 statute miles, making a total run from Newport to Boston directly to sea in the face of an enemy of 273 statute miles. Via the Cape Cod Canal, the distance from Newport to Boston would be only 112 miles, making a saving of about 161 miles. It should be noted that the Vineyard Sound route, with its shifting sands, is unsafe for battleships.

If it be permitted to draw a comparison from the lessons of land warfare abroad, our imagined interior line of waterways may be likened to the trenches existing today in eastern France. The Allied armies fighting the battle of the Marne merely halted the German forces. Our off-shore fleet might not do more than that at sea; in which event they would unite with the naval forces extending from New York to Boston, and, with quick means of communication, would hold the second interior so-called "trench line" through the sounds and bays. They could then, reinforced by the land forces, keep the enemy in check and prevent him from landing troops in our Eastern States. It should also be pointed out that the transfer of troops to and from transports could be safely made within the waters of Buzzard's Bay without interference from an off-shore enemy. The lower end of the bay, in the vicinity of New Bedford, is capable of being protected by mines at a minimum of cost, as the current is trivial in that locality compared to the tide in Vineyard Sound.

The cost of deepening these waterways may be regarded as trivial, for the following reasons: The corporation which has built at Cape Cod the twenty-five foot channel, only eight miles long, at a cost of $12,000,000, has expended at least one-third of that amount for the benefit of the Government; for, in order to reach the canal at its western end, the company dredged five miles in Buzzard's Bay, in United States waters, and constructed a 3,000-foot breakwater in Cape Cod Bay, also beyond its charter limits. Considering the Government appropriations which have been made for less important work of similar character, the expense of

these last two improvements should have been borne by the United States Treasury; they are of infinitely more value to the merchant marine than certain other breakwaters and deepened channels which were provided under river and harbor acts of the past for other localities.

The strongest economic argument in favor of deepening the Cape Cod Canal from twenty-five feet to forty feet at low water is the fact that there is now before the Government a proposition to improve the channel *around* Cape Cod, especially at what is known as Pollock Rip. Now that the canal is completed, this expenditure becomes entirely unnecessary. Its cost is estimated at about $5,000,000, and no dredging of the shifting sands in that locality will result in a permanent channel. In view of this projected expense, its application to the enlarging of the canal would not increase the tax budget at all.

With the Cape Cod canal deepened to 40 feet, and the East River dredged from the New York Navy Yard to Riker's Island, communication for deep-draft warships through east and west inland channels would be assured. The advantage in protective power, both as regards time and distance, to be gained by making use of Long Island Sound, Buzzard's Bay, and Cape Cod Bay, is obvious. The effective defense of five States and the safety of our most populous Eastern cities demand this improvement. Serious study of the subject is imperative. A maximum benefit in time of war will thus ensue from a minimum outlay on the part of Congress. Half the cost of one battleship spent in making a forty-foot canal at Cape Cod would answer affirmatively the " single fleet " argument so ably advanced in favor of the Panama Canal.